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Mitigation and Resiliency of Multi-Agent Systems Subject to Malicious
Cyber Attacks on Communication Links
Mahdi Taheri1, Khashayar Khorasani1, Iman Shames2, and Nader Meskin3
Abstract— This paper aims at investigating a novel type of
cyber attack that is injected to multi-agent systems (MAS)
having an underlying directed graph. The cyber attack, which
is designated as the controllability attack, is injected by the
malicious adversary into the communication links among the
agents. The adversary, leveraging the compromised communi-
cation links disguises the cyber attack signals and attempts to
take control over the entire network of MAS. The adversary
aims at achieving this by directly attacking only a subset of
the multi-agents. Conditions under which the malicious hacker
has control over the entire MAS network are provided. Two
notions of security controllability indices are proposed and
developed. These notions are utilized as metrics to evaluate
the controllability that each agent provides to the adversary
for executing the malicious cyber attack. Furthermore, the
possibility of introducing zero dynamics cyber attacks on
the MAS through compromising the communication links is
also investigated. Finally, an illustrative numerical example
is provided to demonstrate the effectiveness of our proposed
methods.
I. INTRODUCTION
Multi-agent systems (MAS), due to their wide range of
applications, such as in unnamed aerial vehicles (UAV),
next generation aerospace and transportation systems, au-
tonomous and drive-less cars, have been a major topic of
research during the past decade [1]–[5]. One of the chal-
lenges in MAS is to reach a consensus among the agents in a
distributed manner. This problem has been addressed for sys-
tems having various types of linear and nonlinear dynamics
[1], [6]–[8]. To achieve consensus among agents, each agent
needs to transmit its information to its nearest neighboring
agents. This communication is carried out through network
channels that exist among the agents.
Existence of communication networks make the multi-
agent systems to be vulnerable to cyber attacks. Suppose
a group of agents are on an intelligence, surveillance, and
reconnaissance (ISR) mission and an intelligent adversary
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performs an attack on the incoming communication links for
a subset of these agents. The adversary, using the incoming
communication signals can directly modify the received data
associated with the compromised agents. In such a scenario,
one is interested in characterizing conditions under which
the adversary is capable of taking over and controlling the
remainder of the agents. This is the main question that we
are investigating and providing solutions to in this paper.
The topic of security in cyber-physical systems (CPS) has
received a considerable amount of attention in recent years
[9]–[13]. In [9], a framework for cyber attacks and their
monitoring methods was proposed. Moreover, limitations on
monitoring of the cyber attacks for linear time invariant
(LTI) systems were studied. The authors in [10] have studied
various attack scenarios, such as the replay, zero dynamics,
and bias injection attacks for LTI systems based on their
proposed framework.
Cyber attacks in MAS and their detection methods have
been studied from a system theoretic point of view. Secure
consensus tracking control strategies considering two types
of attacks were proposed for MAS in [14]. A distributed
impulsive control for achieving synchronization in MAS
subject to false data injection attacks has also been pro-
posed in [15]. The work in [16] has suggested a control
scheme for multi-agent systems with nonlinearities to reach
a consensus while the agents are under deception attacks. In
[17], cyber-physical attacks on MAS using a system theoretic
approach has been studied. It was shown that the attack on
one agent can spread into other agents that are reachable
from the attacked agent. However, there are limitations and
shortcomings in the above work as all cyber attacks on MAS
are treated as similar to attacks on standard LTI systems. On
the other hand, cyber attacks on communication channels
among the agents and their significance and impacts have
not been addressed and studied in the literature.
For various classes of MAS the controllability conditions
are different as discussed in [18]–[22]. In [22], controllability
of MAS under undirected network typologies was studied
and upper and lower bounds on the controllable subspace of
single integrator agents were given in terms of the distance
and equitable partitions.
In the present paper, LTI MAS systems having directed
graphs that are equipped with dynamic output feedback
controllers that are also under adversarial false data injection
attacks on their communication channels are considered. Our
first objective is to investigate controllability of multi-agent
systems from the adversary’s point of view. Next, by utilizing
the MAS graph topology notions of security controllability
indices are introduced. These metrics are utilized in deter-
mining from each directly attacked agent how many other
agents can be compromised and controlled by the malicious
adversary. Finally, conditions under which the adversary is
capable of executing zero dynamics cyber attacks on the
entire MAS network are provided.
Consequently, the main contributions of this work can
be stated as follows. We first introduce the notion of
controllability attacks on communication channels of the
MAS systems. The importance of these attacks by studying
and developing conditions that would provide the adversary
full control over the entire MAS system is developed and
formalized. Second, it is shown that the adversary is not
capable of exciting zero dynamics of the directly attacked
and healthy agents simultaneously.
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. In
Section II, the basic concepts in graph theory that are
required are presented and model of MAS systems along
with their observers are provided. Model of MAS systems
where the communication channels are under attack as well
as the objectives of this paper are introduced in Section
III. In Section IV, necessary and sufficient conditions for
the adversary to gain full control over the MAS systems
network are formulated and presented. The limitations on
zero dynamics attacks that the adversary is capable of
injecting by compromising the communication channels are
investigated in Section V. An illustrative numerical example
to demonstrate the capabilities of our proposed methodolo-
gies is provided in Section VI.
II. PRELIMINARY
A. Graph Theory
A graph G with a set of nodes or vertices V =
{1, 2, ..., N}, an edge set E ⊂ V × V , where an edge is
defined by the pair of distinct vertices G : (i, j) ∈ E , is
called directed if (i, j) ∈ E does not imply (j, i) ∈ E . The
adjacency matrix of G is defined as A = [aij ] ∈ RN×N ,
where aij = 1 when there is a link from node j to i. The
Ni is the set of neighbors of i which consists of nodes that
have an edge to the node i, |Ni| = di, where | · | denotes
the cardinality of the set. The in-degree matrix is defined as
D = diag(d1, d2, . . . , dN ), and the Laplacian matrix is then
represented as L = D −A.
B. Model of MAS, Observers, and Consensus Protocols
The state space representation of a MAS, consisting of N
agents, is governed by
x˙i(t) = Axi(t) +Bui(t),
yi(t) = Cxi(t), i = 1, ..., N,
(1)
where xi(t) ∈ Rn represents the states of the agent i,
ui(t) ∈ Rm denotes the control input of the agent i,
yi(t) ∈ Rp denotes the output of the i-th agent, and t denotes
time. Matrices (A, B, C) are of appropriate dimensions. It
is assumed that the system (A, B, C) is controllable and
observable.
To design a consensus control protocol for the MAS in (1),
one needs to first estimate the states of the system since only
a few are assumed to be measurable. Consider the following
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Fig. 1. A communication link cyber attack on the agent i. a
ji
1
(t) designates
the cyber attack on the transmitted states of the observer, and a
ji
2
(t)
designates the cyber attack on the transmitted output measurements.
observer-based consensus protocol for the system (1) [6]:
˙ˆxi(t) =Axˆi(t) +Bui(t) +H
∑
j∈Ni
(ζy(t) + Cζx(t)),
ui(t) =Kxˆi(t),
(2)
where xˆi(t) ∈ Rn denotes the state of the observer for the
i-th agent, ζy(t) = yj(t) − yi(t), ζx(t) = xˆi(t) − xˆj(t),
H ∈ Rn×p is a full column rank observer gain matrix, and
K ∈ Rm×n is a control gain matrix that should be designed.
Lemma 1 ( [23]): Given the matrices Q, W, M, and Z
with appropriate dimensions, the Kronecker product ⊗ sat-
isfies the following conditions:
(i) (Q+W )⊗M = Q⊗M +W ⊗M ;
(ii) (Q⊗W )(M ⊗ Z) = (QM)⊗ (WZ).
III. PROBLEM FORMULATION
A. Cyber Attack on the Communication Links
As described in (2), the agent j ∈ Ni transmits its observer
state xˆj(t) and output yj(t) to the agent i as the pair
pji(t) = (xˆj(t), yj(t)). Since this communication is carried
out through a network link, it would be prone and vulnerable
to cyber attacks, as illustrated in Fig. 1. The adversary
disguises their injected signals as legitimate information from
the neighboring agents of their target such that the targeted
agent i only receives the cyber attack signals. This cyber
attack can be considered as a man-in-the-middle type of
attack [24].
Consequently, the malicious attacker adds signals aji1 (t) =
ajixˆ (t)−xˆj(t) and a
ji
2 (t) = a
ji
y (t)−yj(t) to pji(t) so that the
agent i receives paji(t) = (xˆj(t) + a
ji
1 (t), yj(t) + a
ji
2 (t)) =
(ajixˆ (t), a
ji
y (t)) from the agent j. Two cyber attack signals
ajixˆ (t) ∈ R
n and ajiy (t) ∈ R
p are unknown and are to be
designed based on the adversary’s intentions.
Assumption 1: The adversary is capable of executing
the worst case scenario attack in which all the incoming
communication links of a given agent are under attack.
Remark 1: Since the MAS have limited power resources
and to make their communications more efficient they use the
same communication protocols and encryption/decryption
algorithms on all their communication channels [25]. Hence,
if an adversary discovers a vulnerability for one channel of
an agent, it is capable of attacking other channels as well.
Given the observer-based consensus protocol (2), the
closed-loop equations of the system (1) and observer (2)
given the communication link cyber attacks can be refor-
mulated as follows:
x˙i(t) = Axi(t) +BKxˆi(t), (3)
˙ˆxi(t) = Axˆi(t) +BKxˆi(t) +H
∑
j∈Ni
(ζy(t) + qia
ji
2 (t)
+C(ζx(t)− qia
ji
1 (t))), (4)
for i = 1, ..., N with qi = 1 if the communication links of
the agent i are under attack, and qi = 0, otherwise.
B. Objectives
The objectives of this paper are threefold. The first ob-
jective is to investigate conditions on the MAS and its
Laplacian matrix under which the adversary can gain full
controllability over the system in (3). The adversary attempts
to directly attack a subset of MAS agents and control the
remaining agents as followers of the attacked agents. The
second objective is to propose and investigate controllability
measures that are based on graph of the MAS which is not
fully controllable by the adversary and can be employed to
inject attacks on agents that can be controlled through the
directly attacked agents. And finally, the third objective is to
study the possibility of executing zero dynamics attacks in
the MAS governed by (3).
IV. CONTROLLABILITY CYBER ATTACKS
A. Conditions for Controllability
In this subsection, controllability of the MAS (3) and its
observer that is provided in (4) from the adversary’s point
of view is studied. Let us define
Aˇ =
[
A 0
0 A
]
, Bˇ =
[
0 B
0 B
]
, Hˇ =
[
0 0
−H H
]
,
Hˇa =
[
0
H
]
, Kˇ =
[
K 0
0 K
]
, Cˇ =
[
C 0
0 C
]
.
(5)
Using (5), the augmented dynamic of (3) and (4) can be
derived as follows:
˙ˇxi(t) =(Aˇ+ BˇKˇ)xˇi(t) + HˇCˇ
∑
j∈Ni
(xˇi(t)− xˇj(t))
+ HˇCˇ
∑
j∈Ni
qixˇj(t) + Hˇaqiai(t),
(6)
where xˇi(t) = [xi(t)
⊤ xˆi(t)
⊤]⊤, and ai(t) =∑
j∈Ni
ajiy (t)− Ca
ji
xˆ (t).
One can easily partition the agents into two groups,
namely the first group contains agents that are directly
under attack and the second group consists of agents that
receive information from their neighboring agents with-
out any manipulation by the adversary. Consequently, one
has xf(t) = [xˇ1(t)
⊤, xˇ2(t)
⊤, ..., xˇNf(t)
⊤]⊤, which des-
ignates the state of those agents that are not directly
under attack and act as followers. Second, xa(t) =
[xˇNf+1(t)
⊤, xˇNf+2(t)
⊤, ..., xˇN (t)
⊤]⊤, which designates the
directly attacked agents. The subscripts “f” and “a” are used
to denote followers and attacked agents, respectively. Nf
denotes the number of followers and Na denotes the number
of attacked agents, where N = Nf + Na. Without loss of
generality, we assume that the first Nf agents are not under
attack. Consequently, the Laplacian matrix can be partitioned
into the following form:
L =
[
Lf lfa
laf La
]
, (7)
where Lf ∈ RNf×Nf is a grounded Laplacian matrix [26],
La ∈ RNa×Na , lfa ∈ RNf×Na , and lfa ∈ RNa×Nf .
The dynamics of all N agents can be expressed as follows:
x˙a(t) = Aaxa(t) +Baa(t), (8)
x˙f(t) = Afxf(t) +Afaxa(t), (9)
where Aa = INa ⊗ (Aˇ + BˇKˇ) + Da ⊗ HˇCˇ, Af = INf ⊗
(Aˇ + BˇKˇ) + Lf ⊗ HˇCˇ , Da = diag(dNf+1, dNf+2, ..., dN ),
Ba = INa ⊗ Hˇa, Afa = lfa ⊗ HˇCˇ , and a(t) =
[aNf+1(t)
⊤, aNf+2(t)
⊤, ..., aN (t)
⊤]⊤. The dynamics of di-
rectly attacked agents (8) and the followers (9) can be
augmented in the following form:[
x˙a(t)
x˙f(t)
]
=
[
Aa 0
Afa Af
] [
xa(t)
xf(t)
]
+
[
Ba
0
]
a(t). (10)
We are now in a position to state our first definition as
well as the first result of this section.
Definition 1: The MAS described in (10) is controllable
by the adversary if, for every x∗a and x
∗
f and every finite T >
0, there exists an attack signal a(t), 0 < t < T , such that
the MAS states do transition from xa(0) = 0 and xf(0) = 0
to xa(T ) = x
∗
a and xf(T ) = x
∗
f , respectively.
Theorem 1: The adversary is capable of controlling
the system (10) if the pairs (Aˇ + BˇKˇ + diHˇCˇ, Hˇa)
for i = Nf + 1, ..., N , and (Af, Afa) are controllable,
rank(
∑2nN−1
k=1 MkQ
⊤
k w1) is either equal to 2nNf if Nf ≤
Na or equal to 2nNa if Na < Nf, where Q =
[Q1, . . . , Q(2nN−1)], Qk = A
k
aBa for k = 1, . . . , 2nN −
1, Q0 = Ba, M = [M1, . . . ,M(2nN−1)], Mk =∑k−1
z=0 A
z
f AfaQk−1−z , columns ofMk are nonzero, and w1 ∈
R(2nNa)×(2nNa) is a matrix that satisfies w1 ∈ ker(B⊤a ).
Proof: Let us define
A∗ =
[
Aa 0
Afa Af
]
, B∗ =
[
Ba
0
]
. (11)
The controllability matrix of the system (10), C∗ =[
B∗, A∗B∗, . . . (A∗)
2nN−1
B∗
]
, can be expressed in
the following form:
C∗ =
[
Q0 Q1 · · · Q(2nN−1)
0 M1 · · · M(2nN−1)
]
.
For the system (10) to be controllable, C∗ should be of full
row rank. Hence, controllability is achieved if [Q0, Q] and
M are right invertible and rows of Q and M , under some
conditions that are provided below, are linearly independent.
From the definition of Q0 and Q, one can conclude the
right invertibility of [Q0, Q] is equivalent to the pair (Aa, Ba)
being controllable. For this pair the matrix Da is diagonal,
therefore, Aa = blockdiag((Aˇ+ BˇKˇ + dNf+1HˇCˇ), ..., (Aˇ+
BˇKˇ + dN HˇCˇ)) is a block diagonal matrix. The operator
blockdiag(·) denotes a block diagonal matrix. In addition,
INa ⊗ Hˇa = bockdiag(Hˇa, ..., Hˇa) is block diagonal. Hence,
the controllability condition can be studied for each attacked
agent separately.
The matrix M = [M1, . . . ,M(2nN−1)] can be written as
the product of two matrices, namely M∗ and Q∗, i.e., M =
M∗Q∗, where
M∗ =
[
Afa AfAfa . . . (Af)
2nN−2Afa
]
,
Q∗ =


Ba AaBa A
2
aBa · · · A
(2nN−2)
a Ba
0 Ba AaBa · · · A
(2nN−3)
a Ba
...
...
. . .
...
...
... Ba AaBa
0 0 · · · 0 Ba


.
The rows of the matrices Mk =
∑k−1
z=0 A
z
f AfaQk−1−z , k =
1, . . . , 2nN − 1, are equal to the rows of M∗ multiplied
by the columns of Q∗. The matrices Mk not having any
zero column is equivalent to them not having any basis of
ker(M∗) in common with basis of Im(Q∗). In other words,
ker(M∗) ∩ Im(Q∗) = 0. This condition along with the
fact that the number of rows of M∗ is smaller than the
dimensions of Q∗, in turn imply that rank(M) = rank(M∗).
Consequently, for M to be right invertible, M∗ should be
of full row rank, which is satisfied if the pair (Af, Afa) is
controllable.
Considering w1 ∈ ker(B⊤a ) and an appropriate matrix w2,
one has [
w⊤1 0
0 w⊤2
] [
Ba Q
0 M
]
=
[
0 w⊤1 Q
0 w⊤2 M
]
. (12)
Rows of w⊤1 Q and w
⊤
2 M should not be linearly dependent to
have a right invertible C∗. This is satisfied if w⊤1 Q 6= w
⊤
2 M
for every w2. This implies there does not exist any w
⊤
2 such
that the rows of w⊤1 Q and w
⊤
2 M are linearly dependent if
ker(M) * ker(w⊤1 Q). This condition is satisfied if ker(M)∩
ker(w⊤1 Q) = 0. For the latter condition to be satisfied the
following matrix
S =
[
M1 . . . M(2nN−1)
]
×


Q⊤1 w1
...
Q⊤(2nN−1)w1


=
2nN−1∑
k=1
MkQ
⊤
k w1,
(13)
should be either full row rank if Nf ≤ Na or full column
rank if Na < Nf. This completes the proof of the theorem.
Remark 2: Since the conditions in Theorem 1 are difficult
to verify the adversary may not be able to gain control
over the entire network as described in Definition 1. In
such a scenario the adversary is capable of injecting its
attack signals to the directly targeted agents and control the
followers through them. In this type of attack, states of the
directly attacked agents are used as control inputs to the
followers.
The definition of controllability of MAS followers is
provided below.
Definition 2: The followers (9) are controllable through
the directly attacked agents by the adversary if for every x∗f
and every finite T > 0, there exists a proper xa(t), 0 < t <
T , such that the state transitions can be accomplished from
xf(0) = 0 to xf(T ) = x
∗
f .
Assumption 2: The set of eigenvectors of Lf span RNf .
It should be noted that the grounded Laplacian matrix in
case of a directed graph is not necessarily diagonalizable.
For example, consider the Laplacian matrix L = [1, 0, 0, −1;
−1, 1, 0, 0; 0, −1, 1, 0; 0, 0, −1, 1] and its corresponding
grounded Laplacian matrix Lf = [1, 0, 0; −1, 1, 0; 0, −1,
1], where the agent 4 is directly under cyber attack. The
algebraic multiplicity of the eigenvalue of Lf, namely λ = 1,
is 3, however, its geometric multiplicity is 1, implying that Lf
is not diagonalizable. Since in the Theorem 2 provided below
one requires Lf to be diagonalizable, the above Assumption
2 is given.
Proposition 1 ( [27]): The system x˙i(t) = Axi(t) +
Bui(t) is controllable if and only if ∀ vk, k = 1, ..., n,
where vk is the k-th eigenvector of A, vk /∈ ker(BT ).
Theorem 2: Under Assumption 2 the adversary is capable
of controlling the system (9) through the directly attacked
agents (8) according to the Definition 2 if and only if the
pairs (Aˇ + BˇKˇ + diHˇCˇ, Hˇa), (Lf, lfa), and (Aˇ + BˇKˇ +
λjHˇCˇ, HˇCˇ) are controllable for i = Nf +1, ..., N and j =
1, ..., Nf, where λj is the jth eigenvalue of Lf .
Proof: In this attack scenario, the adversary uses xa(t)
as the control input to the followers. Hence, the adversary
should be capable of setting xa(t) to its desired value, which
can be achieved if (8) is controllable. Consequently, the
followers in (9) should be controllable through xa(t). Since
(8) is considered to be controllable, the adversary is capable
of designing a(t) such that xa(t) tracks its desired trajectory
(see Theorem 5.2.5 and Corollary 5.2.6 in [28]).
The controllability condition of the pair (Aa, Ba) was
studied in Theorem 1. Controllability of (Af, Afa) indicates
that the followers are controlled via the state of the attacked
agents, xa(t). In view of Assumption 2, there always exists
an invertible matrix P , with its rows representing Nf right
eigenvectors of Lf, such that PLfP
−1 = diag(λ1, ..., λNf).
Using the similarity transformation P ⊗ In, (9) can be
rewritten as
x˙pf (t) = (P⊗In)Af(P
−1⊗In)x
p
f (t)+(P⊗In)(lfa⊗HˇCˇ)xa(t),
(14)
where xpf (t) = (P ⊗ In)xf(t). Since P is nonsingular, the
controllability of xpf (t) implies the controllability of xf(t).
The matrix (P ⊗ In)Af(P−1 ⊗ In) = blockdiag(Aˇ+ BˇKˇ +
λ1HˇCˇ, ..., Aˇ+ BˇKˇ + λNfHˇCˇ) is block diagonal and (P ⊗
In)(lfa ⊗ HˇCˇ) = Plfa ⊗ HˇCˇ . Consequently, (14) can be
expressed in the following form:
x˙pf (t) =blockdiag(Aˇ+ BˇKˇ + λ1HˇCˇ, ..., Aˇ+ BˇKˇ + λNfHˇCˇ)
× xpf (t) + (Plfa ⊗ HˇCˇ)xa(t).
(15)
Since the rows of P are the right eigenvectors of Lf, in
view of Proposition 1, the controllability of (Lf, lfa) can be
interpreted as not having completely zero rows in the matrix
Plfa. The vector xf(t) contains the states of Nf followers,
however, due to the similarity transformation, xpf (t) contains
a combination of these states, but still one has Nf modes
that are the Nf different blocks of blockdiag(Aˇ + BˇKˇ +
λ1HˇCˇ, ..., Aˇ+ BˇKˇ +λNfHˇCˇ). Next we provide and prove
the necessary and sufficient conditions of our proposed
methodology that are stated in this theorem.
Necessary Condition: Assume the j-th mode of (15)
is controllable through xa(t), while either (Aˇ + BˇKˇ +
λjHˇCˇ, HˇCˇ) is not controllable or the j-th row of Plfa is
zero. Due to block diagonal structure of (15), either the
uncontrollability of (Aˇ + BˇKˇ + λjHˇCˇ, HˇCˇ) or the j-th
row of Plfa being zero results in the uncontrollability of the
mode j, which contradicts the assumption on this mode.
Sufficient Condition: Suppose that the mode j is uncon-
trollable, while (Aˇ+ BˇKˇ +λjHˇCˇ, HˇCˇ) is controllable and
the j-th row of Plfa is nonzero. However, from the block
diagonal structure of (15), the mode j being uncontrollable
implies that either (Aˇ+BˇKˇ+λjHˇCˇ, HˇCˇ) is uncontrollable
or the j-th row of Plfa is zero, which is a contradiction. This
completes the proof of the theorem.
Remark 3: As shown in Theorem 2, the problem of
interest here is to show that there exists a proper xa(t) that
satisfies the controllability objective provided in Definition
2. However, designing the attack signal a(t) such that xa(t)
follows the adversary’s desired trajectory is not within the
scope of this paper and is not addressed here.
Remark 4: Generally speaking, the difference between
the goals in Definitions 1 and 2 has resulted in different
types of conditions that need to be satisfied in Theorems
1 and 2. In Theorem 1, the conditions are more restrictive,
however they ensure controllability over the entire network
for the adversary. Nevertheless, the main objective of the
malicious hacker is to exert the maximum possible influence
on the MAS given the available resources. Consequently, the
adversary may not be able to control the entire network as
studied in Theorem 1, whereas they can still compromise
the system and lead the MAS to dangerous trajectories only
if the conditions in Theorem 2 are satisfied. This result is
illustrated through the numerical example that is provided in
Section VI.
B. Cyber Security Controllability Index
As shown in Theorem 2, the only condition on con-
trollability of the MAS that connects the structure of the
communication graph among the followers and the directly
attacked agents is the controllability of (Lf, lfa). By lever-
aging this controllability condition, we aim to define two
security metrics for the MAS. These notions can be used
to evaluate the security of the MAS with respect to their
controllability by an adversarial intruder. In this subsection,
we assume that all the conditions in Theorem 2, except
for the controllability of (Lf, lfa), hold true. Let us denote
Lˆf = PLfP
−1 = diag(λ1, ..., λNf) and lˆfa = Plfa, where
rows of P are the Nf right eigenvectors of Lf.
Definition 3: The security controllability index of the
directly attacked agent i, designated by SCIi, is defined by:
SCIi = rank(Ci), i = Nf + 1, ..., N, (16)
where Ci = [(lˆfa)i, Lˆf(lˆfa)i, . . . , Lˆ
Nf−1
f (lˆfa)i] denotes the
controllability matrix (considered not to be ill-conditioned)
and (lˆfa)i denotes the i-th column of lˆfa.
The maximum value for SCIi can be Nf, which if
satisfied implies that all the followers can be manipulated
and controlled via the agent i.
Definition 4: The security controllability index (SCI) of
the MAS is defined as
SCI = rank(C), (17)
where C = [lˆfa, Lˆflˆfa, . . . , Lˆ
Nf−1
f lˆfa].
The problem for the adversary is to find the minimum
number of directly attacked agents that gives the full con-
trol over the multi-agent network. More specifically, the
adversary’s goal is to minimize |Na| such that SCI = Nf.
In the literature this problem is referred to as actuator
placement problem [29]. Solving the above minimization
problem provides the adversary with the minimum required
number of agents that the hacker needs to compromise and
attack. A few methods that incorporate graph of the network
to select agents for ensuring controllability over the MAS
have been suggested in [19], [21], [30]–[32].
Remark 5: Due to the possibility of existence of suf-
ficiently small singular values and ill-conditioning of the
matrices C and Ci for i = Nf+1, ..., N in (16) and (17), one
may have nearly singular matrices. In such cases rank(C) and
rank(Ci) can be computed by imposing a tolerance condition
on computation of the rank such that if the singular value
is smaller than a pre-specified tolerance level it is then
considered to be zero.
V. ZERO DYNAMICS ATTACKS THROUGH THE
COMMUNICATION LINKS
Given an s = sa and the dynamics of the directly attacked
agents in (8), the zero dynamics of the MAS are those sa in
which the Rosenbrock system matrix
Pa(s) =
[
sI −Aa −(INa ⊗ Hˇa)
INa ⊗ C 0
]
(18)
is rank deficient, i.e., its rank falls below its normal rank.
This implies that there exist nonzero xa0 and a0 such that[
saI −Aa −(INa ⊗ Hˇa)
INa ⊗ Cˇ 0
] [
xa0
a0
]
= 0, (19)
where Xa(t) = xa0e
sat with Xa(t) defined as the solution to
(8) and a(t) = a0e
sat.
The zero dynamics of the followers (9) are defined as
s = sf and are associated with nonzero directional vectors
xf0 and xaf such that the following is satisfied:[
sfI −Af −(lfa ⊗ HˇCˇ)
INf ⊗ Cˇ 0
] [
xf0
xaf
]
= 0, (20)
where Xf(t) = xf0e
sft with Xf(t) as the solution to (9) and
Xa(t) = xafe
sft.
Definition 5: The zero dynamics sa and sf are excited
in the systems (8) and (9) if their initial conditions and
the attack signal satisfy the conditions in (19) and (20),
respectively.
From (19) and (20) one can conclude that the differences
that exist between the attacked agents and the followers can
result in having different zero dynamics in these two groups.
Moreover, in case of an attacker exciting the zero dynamics,
the states should satisfy xi(t) ∈ ker(C), for i = 1, . . . , N ,
to have a zero output in the system [13].
Lemma 2: The zero dynamics of the followers (9) and
the directly attacked agents (8) are excited by the adversary
in the sense of Definition 5 if (20) and (19) for sa = sf
hold true, while (lfa ⊗ HˇCˇ)xaf 6= 0 and (INa ⊗ Hˇa)a0 6= 0,
respectively.
Proof: Suppose the output of the system is zero with
nonzero xaf and a0 that are in the ker(lfa⊗HˇCˇ) and ker(INa⊗
Hˇa), respectively. This implies that the attack signal does not
have an impact on exciting the zero dynamics. Therefore, in
case of zero dynamics attack by the adversary it is necessary
for the attack signals to satisfy xaf /∈ ker(lfa ⊗ HˇCˇ) and
a0 /∈ ker((INa⊗Hˇa)). This completes the proof of the lemma.
Theorem 3: The adversary is not capable of simultane-
ously exciting the zero dynamics of the directly attacked
agents (8) and the followers (9) in the sense of Definition 5.
Proof: Suppose the adversary excites the zero dynamics
of directly attacked agents in (8) so that Xa(t) = xa0e
sat is
in ker(INa ⊗ Cˇ). Consequently, xa0 should be of the form
xa0 = INa ⊗ xˇa0, where xˇa0 ∈ ker(Cˇ). Since (lfa ⊗ HˇCˇ) ×
(INa ⊗ xˇa0) = lfa ⊗ HˇCˇxˇa0 = 0, one can conclude that
xaf = Xa(0) = xa0 ∈ ker(lfa ⊗ HˇCˇ), which according to
Lemma 2 implies that the adversary is not capable of exciting
the zero dynamics of the followers. Now let us assume (20)
holds and the zero dynamics of the followers are excited
by the adversary. Therefore, (lfa ⊗ HˇCˇ)xaf 6= 0 is satisfied.
This implies that Xa(0) = xaf /∈ ker(INa ⊗ Cˇ). Hence, (19)
does not hold and the zero dynamics of the directly attacked
agents (8) cannot be excited by the adversary. This completes
the proof of the theorem.
VI. NUMERICAL EXAMPLE
In this numerical example, the controllability conditions
that are provided in Theorems 1 and 2 are studied for a
MAS system consisting of 6 agents. The agent dynamics
and its observer are given by (1), and (2), respectively, with
the following matrices [8]:
A =
[
−2 2
−1 1
]
, B =
[
1
0
]
, C =
[
1 0
0 1
]
,
H =
[
0 0.3
−0.3 0
]
, K =
[
−1 2
]
.
The communication graph among the agents is shown in
Fig. 2, and its corresponding Laplacian matrix is L = [1, 0,
0, 0, 0, -1; 0, 2, 0, 0, -1, -1; 0, -1, 1, 0, 0, 0; 0, -1, -1, 2, 0,
0; 0, -1, 0, 0, 1, 0; 0, 0, 0, 0, -1, 1].
Let us assume that the incoming communication links
of agents 4, 5, and 6 are under attack so that one obtains
Lf = [1, 0, 0; 0, 2, 0; 0, -1, 1] and lfa = [0, 0, -1; 0, -1, -1;
0, 0, 0], where the eigenvalues of Lf are λ1 = 1, λ2 = 1,
λ3 = 2, corresponding to the right eigenvectors [1, 0, 0]
T ,
[0, 0, 1]T , and [0, 0.7071, −0.7071]T , respectively. Since
the geometric multiplicity of each eigenvalue is equal to its
6
1
2 3
4
5
Fig. 2. Communication graph of the MAS system.
algebraic multiplicity, conditions in Assumption 2 hold. In
this example, the conditions in Theorem 1 are not satisfied
and rank(C∗) = 5. Hence, the adversary does not have
control over the entire MAS system as provided in Definition
1, however, an adversary may still impact the followers as
described in Definition 2 and Theorem 2.
Considering Theorem 2, the rank of the controllability
matrices (Aˇ+ BˇKˇ+diHˇCˇ, Hˇa) for i = 4, 5, 6 are equal to
4, the rank of the controllability of the pair (Lf, lfa) is 3, and
the rank of the controllability of (Aˇ+BˇKˇ+λjHˇCˇ, HˇCˇ) for
j = 1, 2, 3 is equal to 4. Therefore, the adversary has the
capability of manipulating and controlling the three agents
1, 2, 3 by simultaneously attacking the agents 4, 5, and 6.
As shown in Fig. 3, the six agents reach a consensus and
their states converge, while at t = 30 (s) the adversary injects
its attack signals to the agents 4, 5, and 6 and the remaining
agents are controlled through the directly attacked agents.
In Fig. 3, to illustrate the capability of the adversary in
controlling all the agents, the states of each agent are set
to different values by choosing different attack signals for
the directly attacked agents.
In Fig. 4, it can be seen that the attack that has occurred
at t = 30 (s) is designed such that the agents reach a
new consensus that is desirable to the adversary. In this
attack scenario, the directly attacked agents have the same
attack signals so that they reach to the same point and
the remaining agents follow them. This example illustrates
that even without having full controllability over the MAS
systems as stated in Definition 1, the adversary is capable of
imposing a major impact on the trajectory and behavior of
the agents.
The security controllability index for the directly attacked
agents are SCI4 = 0, SCI5 = 1, SCI6 = 2, and for the
MAS system is SCI = 3. It follows that SCI4 = 0, which
implies that through agent 4 the adversary is not capable
of controlling any of the followers. However, attacking the
agents 5 and 6 do not provide controllability over the agent
4 to the adversary, and hence, in this case it will be attacked
directly.
VII. CONCLUSION
In this paper, certain types of cyber attacks on MAS
systems were investigated and developed. In one cyber attack
scenario, the adversary targets the incoming communication
links for a team of agents and disguises the attack signals as
transmitted information among the agents. Therefore, there
are two groups of agents, those that are first directly attacked,
and those that can be considered as followers of the first
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Fig. 3. State trajectories of the six agents in presence of cyber attack
injected at t = 30 (s).
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Fig. 4. Change in the consensus set point by the adversary injecting cyber
attack signals at t = 30 (s).
group. The conditions under which the adversary has full
control over the two agent groups were investigated. The
notions of security controllability for each of the directly
attacked agents as well as the entire MAS system have
been proposed and developed. These notions can be used
to identify agents that allow the adversary high control
authority over the MAS network. Finally, it was shown that
the adversary is not capable of simultaneously performing
zero dynamics attacks on the directly attacked agents and the
followers. Relaxing the assumption in Theorem 2 is challeng-
ing and is a focus of our future work. Another important topic
for further investigation is to study detectability conditions
of cyber attacks on the MAS systems that were studied in
this paper.
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